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Marquis & Aurbach v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 97 (Nov. 30, 2006)1
 




 Parties petition for writs of mandamus challenging district court orders confirming an 
arbitration award of contingency fees for the original dispute, and denying attorney fees for a 




 The Nevada Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of mandamus on behalf of the 
client, vacating the district court’s order granting contingency fees and awarding subsequent 
costs to the attorney, and ordered the district court to conduct a de novo review of the original 
arbitration award of reasonable attorney fees.  Further, the court dismissed the attorney’s petition 
for writ of mandamus seeking attorney fees for the action attempting to enforce the contingency 
fee agreement.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 1973, Andrew and Judy Tompkins obtained a divorce decree.  The divorce decree 
contained an agreement dividing the community property.  The agreement provided that Andrew 
would keep almost all of the community property, and pay Judy for her interest in the property.  
Judy’s interest totaled $650,000.  Andrew paid $50,000 within six months and the $600,000 
balance by promissory note.  Under the promissory note, Andrew would make interest-only 
monthly payments, with an adjustable interest rate.  The interest rate adjustment constituted 
Judy’s alimony.  Further, Judy had the option of requesting $50,000 of the principle each year.  
However, Andrew could not prepay the principle.  By 1998, Judy had only twice requested the 
$50,000 principle payment.  Thus, Andrew’s monthly payments were over $8,500.  
Consequently, Andrew filed a complaint against Judy, challenging the agreement’s validity and 
Judy’s actions under the agreement. 
 
 Judy retained the law firm Marquis & Aurbach.  Marquis & Aurbach offered Judy a 
choice of fee agreements.  She could choose a $5,000 retainer with hourly billing, or pay a one-
third contingency.  Judy selected the contingency agreement.  After settling the case for a 
$600,000 lump sum payment, the contingency agreement entitled Marquis & Aurbach to a 
$200,000 fee.  
 
 Subsequently, William Kenneth Tompkins, II, the conservator of Judy’s person and 
estate, disputed the contingency fee agreement.  Tompkins and Marquis & Aurbach agreed to 
participate in arbitration.  The Nevada State Bar’s fee dispute arbitration committee found that 
because the fee was partly contingent upon alimony, the fee agreement violated Supreme Court 
Rule 155(4)(a).  Nevertheless, the committee awarded Marquis & Aurbach reasonable attorney 
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fees in the amount of $75,000.  Marquis & Aurbach’s appeal to the committee’s executive 
council was denied. 
 
 Applying de novo review,2 the district court considered Marquis & Aurbach’s petition to 
vacate the award, and Tompkins’s petition to confirm the award.  The district court disagreed 
with the arbitration committee, finding that the contingency fee agreement did not violate SCR 
155.  The dispute was remanded to the committee to determine whether the contingency fee was 
reasonable. 
 
 On remand, the committee awarded Marquis & Aurbach the entire $200,000 contingency 
fee.  The district court confirmed the arbitration award and costs for the subsequent action to 
enforce the agreement, and entered judgment on these awards.  However, the court denied 
Marquis & Aurbach attorney fees for the enforcement action.   
 
 Marquis & Aurbach challenged the district court’s order denying the attorney fees, via 
writ of mandamus petition.  Accordingly, Tompkins filed a writ of mandamus petition 
challenging the district court’s order confirming the arbitration award. 
 
 Justice Hardesty, with Justices Rose, Becker, Douglas, Maupin, and Parraguirre 
concurring, grant Tompkins’s petition and dismissed Marquis & Aurbach’s petition.  The court 
held that the contingency fee agreement violated SCR 155.  Justice Gibbons dissents, agreeing 
with the district court that the contingency fee agreement did not violate SCR 155.      
        
Discussion
 
Writs of Mandamus Petitions 
 
 The court first addressed whether the writs of mandamus petitions were properly before 
the court, or whether the parties could appeal the district court decision.  The court consulted 
SCR 86(12), which allows district court review of the state bar’s fee dispute arbitration 
committee awards.  However, the statute does not address whether the district court’s judgment 
may be appealed.  The court drew its conclusion from the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure 
3A(b)(1), which provides that an appeal may be taken from “a final judgment in an action or 
proceeding commenced in the court in which the judgment is rendered.”  Finding that a fee 
dispute arbitration proceeding is not commenced before the district court; the court determined 
the rule does not apply in this case.  As an appeal is not available, the court held that the writs of 
mandamus petitions were the proper avenue for relief. 
 
Validity of the Contingency Fee Agreement 
 
 Reviewing the district court’s interpretation of SCR 155(4)(a) de novo, the court rejects 
the finding that the statute allows for a contingency fee agreement under these facts.  The court 
                                                 
 
2  Tompkins later filed a petition challenging the standard of review, under NRS Chapter 38, Nevada’s Uniform 
Arbitration Act.  The case was still pending at the time of this decision.  However, the court persuaded Tompkins 
that de novo review was the appropriate standard, under SCR 86(12). 
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disagreed that the domestic relations component ceased to exist after Andrew and Judy obtained 
a divorce decree, over twenty-five years ago.  The agreement arose out of a divorce, the 
agreement provides for alimony, the parties considered the dispute as regarding alimony, and the 
family court division also had jurisdiction to hear the dispute.  Therefore, the court held that the 
dispute is a domestic relations matter subject to the SCR 155(4)(a) contingency fee prohibition. 
 
 Additionally, the court determined that the recovery Marquis & Aurbach initially sought 
to obtain for Judy would result in a modification of the original property settlement agreement, 
thus, modifying the alimony payments.3  This draws a direct link between the amount of attorney 
fees Marquis & Aurbach would be entitled to, under the contingency fee agreement, and the 
amount of alimony.  SCR 155(4)(a) prohibits contingency fees when the fee is based upon “the 
amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof.”   
 
 Even so, Marquis & Aurbach argued that other jurisdictions have allowed contingency 
fee agreements when the post-divorce action sought only to enforce the agreement.  The court 
refers to several opinions supporting Marquis & Aurbach’s argument.  In addition to actions to 
collect past-due payments, the court considered contingency fee agreements permissible in 
actions to modify property settlement agreements which did not provide for support.  However, 
as Marquis & Aurbach sought to recover a lump sum amount, inconsistent with the original 
agreement, the court was not persuaded that Marquis & Aurbach’s intent was to enforce the 
agreement.  Therefore, the court held that the contingency fee agreement violated SCR 155(4)(a).  
 
  Consequently, the court granted Tompkins’s petition and dismissed Marquis & 
Aurbach’s petition.  The court considered Marquis & Aurbach’s petition challenging the district 




 Justice Gibbons agrees with the district court’s ruling that the contingency fee agreement 
did not violate SCR 155(4)(a).  Rather than considering a link to future support as the deciding 
factor in determining whether a contingency fee agreement violates the statute, Justice Gibbons 
focuses on the agreement’s reasonableness.  SCR 155(1) requires that all fees be reasonable.  
Further, other jurisdictions and ethics opinions have established additional factors to consider 
when determining whether a contingency fee in a post-divorce action is permissible.  
Specifically, the majority agreed that in post-divorce actions which do not otherwise violate the 
statute, the fee must be reasonable, any statutory fees awarded should be credited against the 
contingent fee, and the client should be advised in advance of other available options, which 
could include an hourly fee agreement.  Justice Gibbons would permit contingency fee 
agreements where the fee is reasonable and these additional factors are met. 
 
 In this post-divorce action, Judy chose the contingency fee agreement, rather than the 
retainer with hourly billing.  Therefore, the facts support a finding of reasonableness under 
                                                 
 
3 The court emphasized Judy’s desire for a lump sum payment from Andrew.  A modification to the original 
agreement of this sort would modify alimony, as Andrew would no longer be making monthly indefinite interest 
payments on the promissory note’s balance.   
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established factors.  Thus, the language of SCR155 should be modified to permit this type of 




 The court found that the contingency fee agreement between Marquis & Aurbach and 
Judy Tompkins violated SCR 155(4)(a).  While the court accepts the argument that contingency 
fee agreements may be permissible in some post-divorce actions, the contingency fee must not 
be based upon the amount of future support.  Here, the court determined the contingency fee 
agreement was based upon a recovery which modified future alimony payments.  Therefore, the 
court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s order confirming 
the arbitration award, the order awarding costs to Marquis & Aurbach, and the judgment entered 
on the arbitration and costs awards.  Further, the court dismissed the petition for writ of 
mandamus challenging the district court’s order denying Marquis & Aurbach attorney fees for an 
action to enforce the contingency fee agreement.   
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